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ABSTRACT 
 
Thesis Advisors: Andrew Feffer Ph. D. & Lori Marso Ph. D. 
 
Personal data represents a commodity of increasing interest to both the United States 
government and large corporations. While their reasons differ, the two powerful entities have 
worked together to radically expand the domestic surveillance activities in the U.S. As the 
government surreptitiously expanded its domestic surveillance under the guise of its “war on 
terror,” it quickly realized that the advanced technology and access to personal data held by many 
large corporations presented a valuable source of surveillance information.  These companies, in 
turn, similarly saw an opportunity for revenue in both the sale of the data and large governmental 
contracts to provide the technology and infrastructure to support the surveillance activities.  Thus, 
a disturbing yet symbiotic partnership has developed, and with it a political environment that 
thwarts efforts to disclose and provide appropriate regulation to supervise these activities. All of 
this leaves the civilian population at an increased risk—a direct result of an industry that treats the 
individual as both a product and a consumer. In turn, the transition from personal information to 
profitable information has created a myriad of social and political implications that have not yet 
been fully analyzed or understood. Only the future will tell how these developments will ultimately 
play out, whether in favor of corporate-government interests, or the protection of civil liberties. 
This is a critical decision for the future of the United States, and the overarching issues surrounding 
privacy in the digital age have not been adequately addressed by either the legislative or judicial 
branches of government. As technological developments continue to advance, and the demand for, 
and value of, personal data continues to increase, the insistence that these issues be addressed will 
seemingly need to come from American citizens, as their right to privacy is continually being 
eroded. One can only hope that this insistence is not brought about by catastrophic circumstances.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 The data collection industry is worth more than three hundred billion U.S. dollars as of 
2012 (Morris 2012). Technological advances have enabled both the U.S. government as well as 
large private firms to consolidate massive amounts of information on every single person active 
on the internet. Through the use of agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and most notably the NSA, 
the U.S. government has created the largest and most comprehensive surveillance state in the 
history of the world. While certain levels of classification are necessary for the war on terror, the 
government has chosen to not disclose many aspects of its surveillance programs since the attack 
on September 11, 2001. However, with the aid of whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden, the 
public has now been given a comprehensive view of just how pervasive the American 
government’s surveillance of its citizens truly is. Through the use of complex and invasive 
technologies, the government has essentially ignored its citizens’ rights to privacy set forth 
within the U.S. Constitution. What is more, private data broker firms and corporate 
communications companies have utilized similarly invasive forms of surveillance technology to 
not simply collect information on people, but also to sell and profit from it in various ways. With 
personal data representing a precious commodity to both corporations and government, the link 
between the surveillance practices of the two entities has become extremely complex, 
subsequently creating numerous implications for society as a whole. In my thesis, I will contest 
the legitimacy of a collaborative, mutually beneficial relationship between corporate and 
government surveillance. In doing so, a history of the National Security Agency will be studied 
to argue how the agency has revolutionized surveillance technology leading to a myriad of social 
and political changes. With this established, the connection between government and corporate 
surveillance will be elaborated upon, using numerous examples of collaboration to argue how the 
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two entities symbiotically use each other for legal circumvention and profit. This mutually 
beneficial surveillance relationship will be shown to entail an encroachment on civil liberties 
most Americans fail to recognize—both surveillance and data collection reform are regularly 
inhibited in a variety of ways through the powerful combination of government and corporate 
forces, eliminating chances for greater oversight in a business that deals in sensitive, personal 
information. “‘Information is power, and the necessary corollary is that privacy is freedom.’ 
How this interplay between power and freedom play out in the information age is still to be 
determined” (Huhne 2013).  The idea behind this insightful point will be used to examine how 
the issues of this complex interplay may ultimately be resolved going forward. 
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Chapter Two: Origin of the Modern American Surveillance 
State 
 
 The U.S. government came to have the most advanced and invasive surveillance state in 
the world through a radical reshaping of the National Security Agency (NSA). In explaining the 
actions and the decisions made by the NSA, it is beneficial to provide a brief history of the 
agency as well as its fundamental purpose. First and foremost, it is essential to understand that 
the NSA was designed to surveil foreign affairs, not domestic.  It was first conceptualized after 
the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese in the midst of the Second World War. In 
1952, the idea became a reality; the NSA was created to monitor foreign threats and prevent 
surprise attacks (Burns 2005). While the agency grew in capabilities from that point on, it 
remained largely uncontroversial and unknown to the majority of Americans at the time.  
 However, during the Nixon administration, the NSA overstepped its bounds through the 
tapping of American citizens’ phone calls (United States 1974). From that point on, Congress 
made it explicitly clear that the NSA had no power to conduct any form of spying operation on 
American citizens. However, with the attacks on September 11, 2001, the fate and purpose of the 
National Security Agency was forever changed. The federal government capitalized on a sudden 
influx of fervent patriotism and anger running through the American public, taking advantage of 
this surge of emotion to expand its powers, perhaps best epitomized by the passing of the USA 
Patriot Act. Standing for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, this act essentially gave the Bush administration 
free reign to design and implement far more aggressive methods in the war on terror.  
 In looking for more effective approaches to combat and prevent terrorism, the Bush 
administration went to the NSA to gain more insight as to what could be done to prevent another 
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attack. The head of the NSA, General Michael Hayden, was given a radical new authority 
through the President “using both his inherent power under Article Two of the Constitutional 
authorities and the provisions of the AUMF - the act passed by Congress, the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force” (United States 2005). This controversial decision was the beginning 
of the Bush administration’s path down the slippery slope of infringing on the protections 
afforded to US citizens by the United States Constitution, more specifically the Fourth 
Amendment. However, acting on the clear orders given to him by Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Hayden essentially told his employees to adopt a no holds barred approach and, under his 
authority, seek out far more aggressive surveillance programs that could be utilized. Many 
hyper-invasive programs already existed within the walls of the NSA at this time; the only 
change was that they had now been authorized (PBS 2008). Not surprisingly, this sudden 
fundamental change in NSA policy was kept secret from a large majority of the thousands of 
employees within the agency. Hayden and his small circle of top agency personnel knew they 
had to tread lightly and discreetly in the practice of surveilling the American people. Hayden 
himself even came out in an interview stating how he essentially knew, deep down, that this 
would one day come to light and it would not be received well by the public (Hayden, Wiser, 
Gilmore 2014). The men and women of the NSA all knew their basic guidelines were never to 
spy on innocent American citizens. To do so would be a violation of the citizens’ privacy 
rights—this was the clearest breach of the public trust that could be effected by any NSA agent 
and he or she was constantly reminded of such prior to 9/11. 
 However, with his new authority, General Hayden began creating and implementing 
numerous programs to use on the general public such as Trail Blazer and Prism. Programs such 
as these were designed to monitor and collect various forms of data in a dragnet fashion, largely 
  5 
ignoring the right to privacy that is outlined in the Constitution. “Hayden revealed that his 
insistence that it was legal for the NSA to conduct warrantless surveillance was not based on 
even a nodding familiarity with the constitutional issues involved,” but rather the simple fact that 
his orders were his orders and he would follow them without question (McAvoy 2010, 167). In 
defense of Michael Hayden, it is worth mentioning that the man has been a solider for the 
majority of his life, willing to sacrifice himself for his country and what he believes will “save” 
it. However, there were situations in which Hayden could have chosen less invasive techniques 
while still achieving the same effect. For example, despite the fact that certain programs such as 
ThinThread1  existed and could be used for the internet surveillance in a more constitutional 
manner, Hayden chose to use the data-network surveillance program, Trailblazer. While 
ThinThread was designed with the intentional parameter to only collect data coming in or out of 
the country, Hayden instead chose a program that indiscriminately analyzed domestic networks 
as well. While Trailblazer would eventually be abandoned by the agency in 2006 due to its 
extraordinary cost of maintenance2, it evidenced the sudden inundation of increasingly invasive 
surveillance programs and techniques implemented by the agency to use and analyze domestic 
data and metadata. With all the actions of the NSA taking place behind closed doors, the 
ignorance of constitutionality displayed by Hayden spawned what would become the most 
advanced domestic surveillance state in US history. 
 Representing a significant breach of the privacy of unknowing American citizens, agents 
involved with the projects knew they had to be extremely secretive, and also keep the circle of 
                                                
1 ThinThread was a program that could capture and sort massive amounts of phone and e-mail data. It was 
the brainchild of veteran crypto-mathematician Bill Binney. Major contributions to the program were also 
made by Binney’s fellow crypto-mathematicians, Kirk Wiebe and Edward Loomis (Hayden, Wiser, 
Gilmore 2014). 
2 In a 2005 Senate hearing, General Mike Hayden admitted that Trailblazer was hundreds of millions of 
dollars over budget and alarmingly behind schedule (Lipowicz 2005). 
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informed NSA employees as small as possible. However, it was only a matter of time before the 
veteran cryptologists William Binney, Kirk Wiebe, and Edward Loomis who had created the 
ThinThread program, along with its protections, became aware of what was now being done. 
More knowledgeable as to the capabilities of the program than anyone else, the members of the 
ThinThread team felt they could simply not be a part of what they saw as clearly illegal 
activities. Loomis had worked for the agency during the Nixon era and went on record saying he 
saw undeniable parallels between the environment he worked in then, and the environment he 
found himself working in now- the laws were once again being ignored in the face of a perceived 
threat. Binney went on to explain in a PBS interview years later that “the code itself that we 
[ThinThread team] had created evaporated. All the programmers that worked for me, they left for 
other jobs after ThinThread was killed” (PBS 2008). Thus, at the end of October, 2001, Wiebe, 
Binney, and Loomis were left with no choice but to resign as well. These veteran cryptologists 
had been a part of the agency for decades. They would not allow themselves to be associated 
with the illegal actions that were rapidly expanding, and would continue to do so after they left. 
The troubling fact was, “with the rapid growth of technology and the ripe environment of the 
post-9/11 landscape, the NSA and intelligence community could only get bigger and bigger” 
(Verble 2014). In the years following the departure of the ThinThread team, the NSA continued 
to collect massive amounts of data on millions of Americans. By the year 2008, the NSA was 
spending 10 billion dollars a year on data collection alone (DNI Budget Report 2009). The 
amount of information being collected was growing out of control, yet both the Bush and Obama 
administrations had made it clear through numerous statements that they were going to continue 
to deny any and all allegations that the NSA was possibly spying on innocent American citizens. 
“‘This is not a domestic surveillance program,’ Cheney told radio host Hugh Hewitt, adding that 
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‘what we're interested in are intercepting communications, one end of which are outside the 
United States, and one end of which we have reason to believe is al-Qaida-related’” (Braun 
2013, 1). 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts: The Initial Link Between NSA Surveillance 
and Corporate America 
 
 While the radical expansion of NSA surveillance programs continued to increase in the 
decade following 9/11, the fact of their existence still remained unknown to nearly every 
American.  Programs were collecting massive amounts of online data in any and all forms on 
millions of American citizens. Furthermore, with the use of secret warrants authorized by the 
FISA courts [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978], Hayden was enabled to surveil and 
attain Americans’ data and call records from the largest communications companies in the 
country (McAvoy 2010). The fact that a classified, foreign affairs appellate court was given the 
authority to declare lawful a United States federal action that was entirely domestic is 
ludicrous—both the agency and the court were designed around surveillance law that only 
“allows the government to acquire foreign intelligence information concerning non-U.S.-
persons… located outside the United States” (Greenwald 2013). This is a testament to the fact 
that, by the mid 2000s, the entire purpose and function of the NSA had completely changed; not 
only was the agency conducting controversial domestic operations, the court designed to limit its 
power and judge its actions was intentionally limiting legitimate constitutional oversight. 
Essentially, in the name of “the war on terror”, companies such as Verizon, Facebook, Microsoft, 
Google, Yahoo and others were forced to open up all of their records to the eye of the NSA, 
while at the same time, never given the legal ability to disclose or reveal such actions to their 
customers (Lee 2013).  
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 Despite the fact that such an action by the federal government clearly required further 
judicial review, the warrant from FISA technically made its actions legal and thus, the massive 
domestic spying program known as PRISM was formed in 2007. “Although domestic 
surveillance does not fall under the NSA's purview,” this new program enabled “warrantless 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance of communications involving U.S. citizens” (Atkins 
2011). Not only was the agency conducting large-scale operations on American citizens, these 
controversial activities were being facilitated by the federal government's manipulation of the 
law. District and appellate courts such as FISA are obliged to base their judgments using a strict 
and rigid interpretation of the Constitution. However, the actions of the FISA courts 
demonstrated just how far the NSA was willing to go in the effort to maintain its ability to collect 
American citizens’ data and metadata. While the agency hid behind the facade of solely targeting 
and surveilling terrorists or suspected terrorists, the federal courts were pressured into turning a 
blind eye to what was truly occurring, ignoring the “need to rework FISA and NSA protocol to 
adhere to the Constitution and protect US citizens from this overreach of power” (Verble 2014). 
What is more, the NSA’s collection of citizens’ data through programs like PRISM now meant 
major American corporations were involved with the process of surveilling the population in 
dragnet fashion. This relationship between government surveillance and big business has only 
grown since 2007 and, with the leaks provided by Edward Snowden, much of the details 
surrounding it have become known to the public.  
 In response to allegations of giving away customer data to government, nearly all of the 
accused companies have either not responded, or chosen to deny in various forms of overly-
legalistic language. Mark Zuckerberg responded to the media saying “Facebook is not and has 
never been part of any program to give the U.S. or any other government direct access to our 
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servers;” Microsoft stated, “We only ever comply with orders for requests about specific 
accounts or identifiers…Google's Zunger says that Google only responds to "specific orders 
about individuals” (Lee 2013). Across the board, the companies have denied ever granting 
companies direct access to their servers. However, aided by The Guardian’s leaking of 
Snowden’s documents on PRISM, top-secret NSA slides have stated that the program involves 
“collection directly from the servers of these U.S. service providers: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, 
Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, Youtube, Apple” (Lee 2013). Making matters worse, while the 
rules regarding PRISM and those under “section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act” assert that 
the NSA can only collect data on someone who has been found to be in either deliberate or 
inadvertent contact with a foreign target, documents “from Snowden showed that the NSA 
breached privacy rules thousands of times a year” (MacAskill 2013). However, even with all the 
damaging evidence against FISA and the NSA, the federal government responded by simply 
enacting “a new, highly diluted FISA law—the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA),” 
legalizing “much of the Bush warrantless NSA program” (Greenwald 2013). As in so many other 
cases with the NSA, the lack of oversight and legitimate judicial review enabled the agency to 
vastly overstep its authoritative bounds with little to no risk of punitive consequences. The FISA 
courts have evolved to essentially function as a rubber stamp in their permissiveness and 
unjustifiable interpretation of constitutional rights to privacy. 
 On top of all this, the FISA courts have legalized spying on the activity of people’s 
phones, which has in turn created a never ending flood of secret warrants to all telephone 
providers. While the argument is based on national security, such an expansive project demands 
a more thorough examination of constitutionality. The numbers make this clear by themselves: 
“One of the larger carriers, AT&T, responds to roughly 700 requests a day, 230 of which are so-
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called ‘emergencies,’ exempting them from standard court orders” (Whitehead 2012). While the 
official number for 2012 is approximately 1.3 million, “The number of requests is almost 
certainly higher… and the number of people affected much higher, because a single request often 
involves targeting multiple people” (Whitehead 2012).  
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Chapter Three: Government Surveillance Outsourcing and The 
Role of the Corporation 
 
 Why did companies turn over our data so willingly? While many of the company 
executives claim the contrary, the unfortunate truth that is beginning to become increasingly 
apparent is that companies do not simply hand over customer data to the government as a result 
of a farcical overproduction of FISA warrants—they do so willingly because they make a profit. 
In understanding the link between corporate and government surveillance, it is essential to 
realize that corporations are not simply giving away customer data. They are more or less 
choosing to do so for the same reason they do anything—to make a profit.  
 With the huge market for smartphones in the United States as well as abroad, large 
corporations involved with the technology have acquired a massive arsenal of possible 
surveillance capabilities. Even though the United States government has amassed a huge range of 
similar capabilities over the past decade, the incentives offered by access to corporate servers’ 
data and metadata trump much of what the NSA and FBI are capable of. Thus, while 
“government agencies are increasingly acquiring the technology to track cell phones themselves, 
most rely on cell phone companies to provide them with the user data” (Whitehead 2012). What 
is more, the “private sector partners with government and local law enforcement agencies in 
developing technology to conduct extensive domestic surveillance” in exchange for generous 
contracts. With this, government spying is no longer reserved to agencies like the NSA and FBI. 
Federal, state and even local police forces are now able to utilize previously nonexistent 
technologies, such as “Stingray” cellular phone tracking—an invention by Harris Corporation. 
After a recent ruling by the United States Court of Appeals, it was deemed lawful to track 
cellular devices without first acquiring a warrant, essentially creating a useful tool for 
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government and police forces to circumvent legal restrictions (Whitehead 2012).  This 
circumvention has been intensified by what is essentially an extraordinarily powerful, military 
grade piece of technology—Stingray.  “ACLU privacy researcher Christopher Soghoian” 
explains how “the government uses the device [Stingray] either when a target is routinely and 
quickly changing phones to thwart a wiretap or when police don’t have sufficient cause for a 
warrant” (Walker 2013). While this explanation leads one to assume Stingray is reserved solely 
for serious criminals or people suspected of a serious crime, it opens the door for police forces to 
use the technology in far more invasive and expansive ways. As with Trail Blazer and Prism 
before it, this legitimate technology is not the problem—it is the abuse of the technology. 
 Not too long ago, wiretapping a phone required significant time and resources, and often 
yielded insufficient results. On the other hand, Stingray appears to be so radically advanced that 
many people caught committing crimes by the device have been released simply to avoid any 
discussion of the technology in court (Pagliery 2015). However, according to a recent document 
from a New Jersey district court regarding a Stingray case that did receive judicial review, the 
suitcase-sized device is not only capable of tracking information like who someone called and 
the duration of the conversation, it can essentially extract the entire digital-footprint3 of a phone 
from over a mile away (18 US code 2012). What is more, as if a mile-wide radius was not 
extensive enough, federal planes now fly over various parts of the country and, with the same 
mobile appearance as any cell tower, collect the passive digital-footprints of all mobile devices 
caught in the data dragnet below (Pagliery 2015). This impressive piece of technology would 
never have been made possible without the interplay between Harris Corporation and the 
government. This is merely one example of the corporate-government relationship that manifests 
                                                
3 A digital-footprint refers to the trail of data left behind via any digital service. An active footprint is data the user 
knowingly shares; a passive footprint is data extracted without the knowledge of the user.  
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itself in society in countless ways. However, while Stingray is remarkably advanced, its 
relatively high price still makes it difficult to acquire by most police forces’ standards, and thus it 
is used most widely in larger cities like New York and Los Angeles. However, this by no means 
deprives lesser funded police departments from obtaining similarly advanced techniques of 
cellular tracking and surveillance—yet, instead of doing the surveillance themselves, many 
police departments simply employ corporations. 
 This has developed a new market in which telecommunications corporations can profit 
directly from sharing their own customers’ data. While government agencies and police forces 
are now able to afford various spying technologies, the technologies still are not free. As 
government budgets tighten, the telecommunications corporations have responded happily to this 
new opportunity to increase profit margins, providing police agencies with prices for acquiring 
various pieces of information one has on his or her mobile phone. For example, “Sprint charges 
$120 per target number for 'Pictures and Video,' $60 for 'E-Mail,' $60 for 'Voicemail,' and $30 
for 'SMS Content’” (Whitehead 2012). The capabilities of cellular companies like Sprint are so 
advanced that just one employee can track upwards of 300 people at the same time. Offering a 
better perspective of how widely used this surveillance contracting is becoming, Sprint employs 
a staggering 110 people to solely manage this service—that’s a possible 33,000 people being 
tracked at any point in time by just one cellular provider (Whitehead 2012). One can only 
speculate as to the capabilities possessed by AT&T and Verizon Wireless, two significantly 
larger telecom corporations. 
 While major corporations have been repeatedly contracted by government agencies to 
increase dragnet surveillance, smaller, more specialized companies have also been utilized to 
experiment with revolutionary technologies most people would struggle to comprehend. A 
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unique example can be found through former Air Force pilot Ross McNutt’s company, Persistent 
Surveillance Systems (PSS). McNutt worked extensively with the Air Force during the military 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, not as a pilot, but as an engineer who theorized and 
successfully implemented a new-age form of aerial surveillance that helped hunt down bombing 
suspects over wide swaths of desert and urban terrain (Schulz, Pike 1). McNutt has since retired 
from working with the military, but he realized the significant impact his technology could have 
on domestic surveillance. Soon after, he formed PSS and his HawkEye II, ‘eye in the sky,’ 
technology has now been used in numerous cities across the United States. To elaborate, 
McNutt’s revolutionary form of surveillance “involves the deployment of [192] megapixel 
cameras on a Cessna aircraft, which circles over a city for up to 10 hours at a time,” ultimately 
giving law enforcement the ability to examine 30-square-miles of land and “retroactively track 
any vehicle or pedestrian within that area. It is the ultimate Big Brother ‘eye in the sky’” 
(Stanley, 1). When asked to describe his idea in layman’s terms, McNutt essentially stated, 
“Imagine Google Earth with TiVo capability” (Reel 2016, 1). To be clear, the issue does not 
necessarily lie in McNutt’s invention, and there is no denying the potential benefit it has to deter 
crime, a point Ross McNutt stresses when he pitches his idea to metropolitan police divisions. 
Rather, the issue lies in the fact that a deterrent such as this cannot achieve McNutt’s stated goal 
when it is being used on communities and cities across the country without the citizens being 
made aware. 
Despite attempts by the FBI and police to keep McNutt’s technology a secret, 
information about the “eye in the sky” being used over the skies of Compton eventually leaked in 
2013, and thus the ACLU and other organizations seeking to protect civil liberties immediately 
demanded answers from the FBI. Even the Mayor of Compton, Aja Brown, was furious about 
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not being informed whatsoever, publicly stating, “There’s nothing worse than believing you are 
being observed by a third party unnecessarily” (Jennings, Winton & Rainey 2014, 1). A 
spokesman for the Bureau, Christopher Allen, met these demands for answers with a blunt claim 
that the FBI’s aerial technologies “are not equipped, designed or used for bulk collection 
activities or mass surveillance” (Harress 2014, 1). Yet, as has been the case countless times 
before, this statement simply was not true, and by 2015 there were numerous claims throughout 
the country that this technology was indeed being used to surveil civilian populations in several 
American cities, most notably Baltimore. Baltimore provides a unique example of how police 
forces can circumvent public disclosure of their new forms of handling crime and surveilling the 
public. One of the key ways the public becomes aware of and is able protest these new, invasive 
technologies is by denying the necessary funding for these costly practices. This occurs through 
city councils and elected officials either denying or allowing their police force an allocation of 
funding based on whether or not they believe the proposal is necessary and ethical—obviously 
their decisions are heavily influenced by public opinion. Considering the Baltimore Police 
Department’s long-running history of racial bias, as proven by a recent 163-page report by the 
Justice Department, one can likely speculate that a proposal for this costly technology system4 
would have been unsuccessful (Grinberg 2016, 2). Yet, all it took was a massive, individual 
donation from Texas based billionaire and former Enron trader, John Arnold, to completely 
circumvent this process of public oversight and thus, the “Baltimore Program” was given the 
green light to begin spying on an entire city without its knowledge or consent (Reel 2016, 7).  
This unique form of surveillance in Baltimore highlights many issues surrounding 
corporate involvement in federal and state affairs. While PSS’s technology undoubtedly benefits 
                                                
4 According to Ross McNutt, a contract between his company and a metropolitan police force would cost 
approximately $2 million a year (Reel 2016, 4). 
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the fight against crime, its lack of disclosure has dangerous implications for communities as a 
whole, especially in places like Baltimore where a lack of trust between the police and the 
civilian population has been at the heart of countless protests, both peaceful and violent. Systems 
like McNutt’s HawkEye II being privately funded by billionaires as a means to circumvent public 
approval are clear evidence that something is wrong, and perhaps unconstitutional. What is more, 
implementing it the way the Baltimore Police Department did gives off the notion that they know 
what’s best for everyone, and the masses should remain blissfully ignorant, unaware that every 
resident of the city has literally been converted into a data point on a screen that tracks 
everywhere they go within a 30-mile radius. Further, the Baltimore Project is not an isolated 
incident in regard to the mutually beneficial relationship between police forces and private 
companies dealing in weapons technologies. ACLU attorney David Rocah describes it best, 
stating: 
What the secret funding from the Arnolds meant is that it [HawkEye II] didn’t even have 
to be disclosed to the city’s purchasing folks and the mayor didn’t know, the city council 
didn’t know… nobody knew. The fact is that surveillance technologies are acquired by 
police departments all over the country all the time with zero public input, even where the 
Arnolds aren’t secretly funding it. This case is just an extraordinary, an extreme, example 
of a larger problem. (Dart 2016, 3) 
 
 One can clearly see how this represents a dangerous development in terms of the 
mutually beneficial relationship corporations have developed with federal and state institutions. 
While it would be unfair to ignore the arrests that have resulted from data vending, the growing 
use of the service “blurs the lines between law enforcement charged with protecting the public 
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and corporations seeking to profit from it” (Boghosian 2013, 43). The merits of this system 
would be clear in an ideal world; however, that is not the world we live in, and the habitual abuse 
of power in today’s world leads one to envision a number of ways citizens could suffer from this 
symbiotic relationship. With the massive amounts of power wealthy corporations control, selling 
their own customer data as a means of assisting in the apprehension of people without any actual 
warrant could lead to exploitation. Ultimately, it would simply be a heightening of the degree of 
exploitation already occurring— “Police and private business have built a leviathan surveillance 
network” with a dearth of accountability (Boghosian 2013, 99). With it, police departments gain 
an invaluable form of surveillance; telecommunications companies gain profit—everybody wins, 
except us. The masses are given no control over their mobile privacy rights and, as taxpayers, 
they are essentially funding the entire operation in the first place—we are indirectly paying 
corporations to give our personal information to the police through tax revenue. As this data 
vending continues to grow, America’s public sphere risks falling under a veil of corporate-
government domination. Just as data vending has created a collusive relationship between 
government and corporation, data mining as a whole has evolved into a multi-billion dollar 
industry with significant interplay between government and the private sector. 
Fusion Centers: The Start of Data-Mining Collaboration Between Government and the 
Private Sector 
 Along with the questionable legality of the domestic spying program, the actual 
implementation of the surveillance mechanisms created a highly secretive, collusive relationship 
between the government and private security companies. Functioning essentially as regional 
intelligence sharing facilities, fusion centers were built throughout the country beginning in 
2003, proposed as a key tool in antiterrorism that would be primarily managed by the 
Department of Homeland Security (Isikoff 2012). The construction and maintenance of these 
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fusion centers has cost the government billions, yet the evidence of any significant increase in 
national security has yet to be proven. However, while fusion centers have achieved little more 
than an increase in the federal deficit, they have indeed created a profit—a corporate profit. 
Through the government’s creation of what are essentially numerous state-of-the art data-mining 
facilities, the private security companies have been able to scour “public databases and other 
sources to gain information related to spending habits, real estate transactions, and insurance 
claims” (Boghosian 2013, 156). As the commodity of personal data continues to increase in 
value, private security companies have been enabled to profit in more ways than one via their 
continued fusion center contracts. Made more concrete by the actual figures, “approximately 
1,931 private security companies and 1,271 government organizations are currently engaged in 
intelligence gathering” across the country, and while the threat of terrorism has somewhat 
declined since 9/11, intelligence gathering has increased exponentially (Boghosian 2013, 100). 
Facts such as these begin to suggest the idea that, while terrorism is a very real danger, the 
enhancement of surveillance is creating a dangerous weapon against the domestic civilian 
population as well. To elaborate, fusion centers have not simply failed to effectively stop 
terrorism, they have become vehicles for government discriminatory racial and religious 
profiling, consistently spying “on American Muslims without a justifiable law enforcement 
reason for doing so” (Isikoff 2012).  
This disturbing trend fuels bigotry and racism towards the 3.3 million Muslims living in 
the United States, of which only a handful are in any way a threat to national security. Making 
matters worse, while many forms of surveillance such as these are done covertly, there is so 
much unabashed hatred of Islam in parts of the country that many politicians have publicly 
endorsed surveilling innocent Muslims, such as Senator Mitt Romney who “openly called for 
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fusion centers to wiretap mosques and spy on foreign students” under the auspice of fighting 
terrorism (Monahan & Palmer 2009, 628). This kind of political rhetoric can have dangerous 
effects on uninformed citizens who may take it is a confirmation that all Muslims living here and 
abroad are indeed a threat to their safety, a belief that is simply untrue and quite dangerous. What 
is more, fusion center surveillance has not only been used as a means of religious profiling, it has 
also been used against groups with ‘unpopular’ beliefs regarding more specific issues in the 
country, such as animal rights activists and anti-war protesters. Despite these groups solely 
protesting in legal, non-violent ways, “union and labor activists, environmentalists, and animal-
rights protesters have also been documented targets of surveillance under the dubious rationale 
of preventing terrorism” (Monahan & Palmer 2009, 628). Surveillance projects such as these rely 
on the capabilities of fusion centers across the country, and to be clear, they are illegal based on 
the operating principles governing when it is acceptable to surveil and collect information on one 
or more persons. To elaborate, Title 28, Part 23 of the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations 
states: 
A project shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information… only if there is 
reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and 
the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity. A project shall not collect 
or maintain criminal intelligence information about the political, religious or social views 
[italics added], associations, or activities of any individual or any group, association, 
corporation, business, partnership, or other organization unless such information directly 
relates to criminal conduct or activity and there is reasonable suspicion that the subject of 
the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct or activity. (28 CFR 23.20) 
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 Generalized surveillance of mosques and the collection of information about non-violent 
protesters and foreign students is clearly in violation of this statute. The way in which this 
criterion is routinely circumvented is by manipulating what can be deemed as a ‘reasonable 
suspicion,’ even though ‘reasonable suspicion’ is clearly defined in Part 23 of the ECFR as well. 
In the end, these unlawful surveillance practices contingent on fusion centers occur so frequently 
because there is simply not enough internal oversight. When the information collected does 
ultimately bring about some form of crime prevention, it is publicized and used as a defense of 
such practices. Yet, far more often than not, the massive amount of data collected on innocent 
people via fusion centers yields no positive results whatsoever, and the cost of doing so is 
immense. This is how the door for data-mining collaboration between government and the 
private sector has been opened.  
Federal and especially state governments are unable to afford the costs of maintaining 
fusion center surveillance on their own. To collect the significant quantities of data they desire, 
they have no choice but to contract private agencies who do not have the same set of values and 
restrictions as the Department of Homeland Security(DHS)—the ultimate priority of the DHS is 
counter-terrorism, not making a profit. A major challenge for these private security companies is 
how they navigate the balance between making a profit and not infringing upon citizens’ right to 
privacy. According to recent studies, it appears these “private companies may have a more lax 
orientation to privacy protection than do government agencies,” and thus DHS agents working in 
“fusion centers can circumvent some privacy protections by working with them” (Monahan & 
Palmer 2009, 631). Personal, protected information belonging to innocent people is being 
outsourced to private companies whose employees have no stated obligation to serve the public, 
and now it appears it is purposefully being done so that sensitive, personal data can be moved to 
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a less regulated environment. Another troublesome aspect of these third-parties gaining access to 
fusion center databases is the fact that many of them are not as secure as they lead DHS agents to 
believe. Whereas the firewall and database protections of the Department of Homeland Security 
are nearly impenetrable, privately contracted companies lack the same capabilities, and thus 
“[h]ackers may now gain access to a wealth of additional, potentially damaging information” that 
leads to widespread identity theft (Monahan & Palmer 2009, 631). 
Ultimately, fusion centers have been revealed to be largely an expensive, biased 
enterprise, damaging social relations at the expense of the taxpayer and straining the bounds of 
U.S. citizens’ First and Fourth Amendment rights. What is more, after fourteen years of 
questionable results at a cost of an estimated 1.4 billion dollars, one cannot help but question 
whether or not the intricate symbiotic link between government and corporations is the 
underlying reason for continued funding and construction of fusion centers—especially as 
personal data continues to grow exponentially in value. 
  
  22 
Chapter Four: Big Data Corporations and Why You’ve Never 
Heard of Them 
 
The government is not alone in its desire for your personal information. While data-
mining has been established for some time, the digitalization of American society has enabled a 
meteoric rise in the industry. Furthermore, in attempting to keep its practices secret and 
uninhibited, the government has helped enable the data collection industry to expand at even 
greater speeds through remaining highly unregulated and unknown to a large majority of the 
population. This has in turn allowed companies like Acxiom to post annual sales of 1.13 billion 
dollars, yet still remain completely unrecognizable to almost any American you talk to (Singer 
2012). Conversely, large data-collection firms almost certainly know a good deal about you. 
While the specific ways in which companies like Acxiom independently collect personal 
information will be touched upon below, one might be surprised as to how these companies 
collect this information in direct collaboration with state and federal government.   
State and federal governments have massive amounts of information stored on civilians 
in the United States—this is simply the way in which our society functions. If you want to drive 
a car, then you need to get a license at the Department of Motor Vehicles; if you want to travel to 
a different country, you need to apply for a passport through the Department of State; if you want 
to receive mail, you must tell the United States Postal Service what your address is, etc. This 
personal information has value to businesses in myriad ways, but most people assume the 
personal information they disclose to the government is a private exchange. Yet this is not the 
case: in fact, selling personal data has been a lucrative practice done at many levels of 
government for some time now.  
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Data collection firms such as Acxiom are actually the biggest customers for these various 
agencies, and data brokers are all too happy to hand over vast sums of money in exchange for 
equally vast amounts of personal information—one could go as far as to say that, “government 
data [is] the lifeblood for commercial data brokers. And government dragnets rely on obtaining 
information from the private sector” (Angwin 2014, 73). To elaborate, one of the most valuable 
pieces of civilian data sold by state governments are driver’s licenses and traffic violation 
records. In fact, “Florida alone makes about $62 million a year selling driver’s license data;” 
similarly, the “U.S. Postal Service generates $9.5 million in revenue a year allowing companies 
like Acxiom to access its National Change of Address database” (Angwin 2014, 69). State 
governments and federal agencies sell information like this every day. Even our elections, one of 
the country’s oldest and most sacred practices, is not protected from this corporate-government 
collaboration. To participate in the United States elections, citizens are required to fill out a form 
from the government that requires personal information such as one’s name, address, and date of 
birth. Most people assume the information they divulge in order to take part in one of America’s 
most sacred processes will be free from any and all profit-driven disclosure, and unfortunately 
they are mistaken.  
Federal voting records are sold to data brokers in all states; in fact, a “2011 study found 
that a statewide voter list sold for as little as $30 in California and as high as $6,050 in Georgia” 
(Angwin 2014, 74). This is done every year, and it enables data brokers who continuously amass 
voters’ data to build elaborate profiles on people who do not even know they are being observed. 
While some may view this as an unjust practice, it is completely legal and the data brokers who 
specialize in it, such as Aristotle Inc., proudly boast the “ability to identify 190 million voters by 
more than ‘500 consumer data points’ such as their credit rating and size of their mortgage” 
  24 
(Angwin 2014, 75). The dangers brought about by this corporate-government collaboration raise 
serious concerns about the integrity of the US elections, especially when one considers the point 
of view that the electoral college has enabled the votes of certain states to, in a sense, carry far 
more weight than that of another. What is more: 
Guess who buys Aristotle’s enriched data? Politicians, who are sometimes using 
government money. Aristotle crows that ‘every U.S. President—Democrat and 
Republican—from Reagan through Obama, has used Aristotle products and/or 
services…’ In fact, an intrepid 2012 thesis by a Harvard undergraduate… found that 
fifty-one members of the U.S. House of Representatives bought data from Aristotle using 
some of their congressional allowances, allowing them to identify their constituents by 
the age of their children, whether they subscribe to religious magazines, or if they have a 
hunting license. (Angwin 2014, 74) 
Most people are baffled upon hearing this, yet it is completely legal and occurs more and 
more every year. In turn, the integrity of American elections and bipartisan politics—areas 
already under harsh scrutiny, and for good reason—are thrust into an even more precarious 
environment. Imagine the impact this plethora of voter data, when coupled with the droves of 
consumer data, could have when the next cycle of redistricting takes place in 2020; the 
opportunity for gerrymandering would be greatly increased and this data would technically allow 
it to be conducted without clearly violating the Voting Rights Act. In other words, come 2020, 
state politicians could gerrymander district lines without explicitly showing favor to a given 
party, but instead by encapsulating within their district the largest concentrations of people 
whose hundreds of ‘consumer data points’ correlate to a strong likelihood of voting for one or 
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more specific candidates. The idea of aggregated consumer data points correlating to a specific 
political party is by no means an exact science, yet it is a game of numbers that often proves 
itself to be correct in significant quantities. Thus, as the trend continues to grow, congressional 
districts—the building blocks on which our democracy rests—may be so analytically 
manipulated as to make true electoral competiveness an abnormality. For evidence of this 
growing development, one need not look further than states for whom levels of gerrymandering 
are already extreme, such as Pennsylvania and North Carolina: 
In the election of 2012, Barack Obama won the state of Pennsylvania with 52 percent of 
the vote. Democratic House candidates won 51 percent of the vote. But Democratic 
House candidates won only 28 percent of the state’s seats. In North Carolina, Democratic 
House candidates won 50.6 percent of the vote, but Republicans seized 9 of the 13 
congressional seats. By 2014, they would have 10. The list goes on. (Wagner 2016, 2) 
The greatest testament to the significant impact mass data analysis will have during the 
next redistricting cycle perhaps lies in the degree of influence this same process had in the 
previous cycles. After all, even though the technology behind data collection has grown 
exponentially in recent years, the general theory of compiling large amounts of data to make 
voter predictions has been around long before computers. That being said, with the proliferation 
of computing technology, “fancy pencils… parchment sheets and desks covered with papers 
have given way over the last two redistricting cycles to very powerful computer programs” 
(Daley 2016, 104). Of all these computer programs, the most effective and widely used is a 
program called Maptitude. Maptitude is an advanced data-analysis software specifically designed 
for redistricting. It is a product of the Caliper Corporation, a company just 30 years old whose 
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executives shrewdly recognized the gains they stood to make if they could make quality 
redistricting software affordable. Whereas such software existed even as early as the late 1980s, 
it “then priced between $500,000 and $1 million,” greatly “beyond the reach of most state 
legislatures” (Daley 2016, 112). Today, Caliper can license Maptitude’s complete services for 
less than $5000.5  Building upon this, while Maptitude data analysis provides one with the 
platform to favorably redistrict, it is the statistical wunderkinds hired to operate this software that 
truly bring about the algorithmic magic. One of these gifted statisticians, a man named William 
Desmond, was helpful enough to explain how this software works in laymen’s terms. 
 William Desmond is a senior micro-targeting analyst for a specialized data broker called 
Strategic Telemetry. His past work has played a pivotal role in various elections, most notably 
his significant contribution to the Obama campaign in the 2008 presidential election. Desmond’s 
entire professional life has been devoted to this type of political data analysis, evidenced well by 
the exceedingly blasé manner with which he describes the seemingly omnipotent predictions he 
can make with just a few clicks of his cursor. In a recent interview, Desmond explained how, 
“Maptitude comes preloaded with all the census data you could ever imagine, and some that you 
had no idea was even collected” (Daley 2016, 107). The software processes all this data and 
outputs discernible layers of information, the smallest of which is called a census block, which 
essentially corresponds to a city block. From here, the layers build upon themselves—census 
blocks form a census tract, these tracts create cities, and then counties, and ultimately entire 
congressional districts are laid out in predictive configurations that allow political campaigns to 
see their electorate in an entirely new light. If one desires even greater accuracy, simply plug in 
                                                
5 The complete price listings for all of Caliper Corporation’s Maptitude services can be found at 
http://www.caliper.com/maptpric.htm 
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more data collected from third-parties. If done properly, one single census block can become a 
complex entity with its own array of layers—in a sense, increased data enables “the statistics [to] 
get even more granular: total population, male population, female population, white population, 
multirace[sic], mixed race, ‘every other race,’” etc., all combine to reveal shockingly precise 
voter predictions (Daley 2016, 107). This software is exceedingly difficult to comprehend for the 
vast majority of people, but its brilliance lies in the fact that it can take incomprehensible 
terabytes and interpret them into projections simple enough for even a politician to understand—
and this is where the danger lies.  
 The prevention of gerrymandering has arguably never faced a more daunting obstacle 
than advanced data software such as Maptitude. As the amount of purchasable ‘consumer data 
points’ about civilians continues to skyrocket, the ability to disguise discriminatory 
gerrymandering via complex software increases as well. What is more, according to William 
Desmond, the current state of political data mining has already put the Voting Rights Act in 
serious jeopardy.  Desmond would be the first to tell you that, “[i]f your goal is… to create 
districts that will reliably perform for a specific party,” and you are capable of using Maptitude 
“correctly, you can create an index that bounds enough of the right people, in the right way, to 
guarantee a result throughout the decade, no matter the overall direction of the electorate” (Daley 
2016, 108-9). What is more, considering the exponential rate at which technology advances, one 
can only imagine what these types of data-analysis programs will be capable of even as early as 
2020 when the next redistricting cycle occurs. Whereas most people are wholly unaware about 
the existence of the current technology, people in Desmond’s field are keenly aware of its 
implications, and indeed they have speculated as to the remarkable capabilities that will be 
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available to well-funded political campaigns in the not-so-distant future.  It is the belief of micro-
targeting analysts such as Desmond and his peers that:  
‘Once people get really serious about trying to win state legislatures, it’s going to be 
somebody building predictive models to tell you what that area is going to look like at 
some point in the future. Knowing the technology, that’s where it easily could be. Now, it 
would take a huge investment in resources…’ [but] that’s the next political 
Moneyball[sic]. Now that the Citizens United decision has unleashed limitless dark 
money, it only takes one billionaire to write an eight-figure check and bet that his or her 
side could fine-tune a model so smart and intuitive that it locks in control of the House 
for another decade. An upfront investment like that would probably save money merely 
by taking potentially competitive races off the table for ten years. (Daley 2016, 118). 
 While the technological capabilities of the future and their potential impact in relation to 
gerrymandering are indeed daunting, for the sake of this argument, it is of vital importance to 
point out that the technology and its creators are not the issue. The true problem lies in the fact 
that the massive exchange of data and money between governments and the thousands of data 
brokers has enabled these technologies to inadvertently become a genuine threat to our 
democracy. These technologies have essentially been weaponized by the limitless ammunition 
that is available civilian data. What is more, whereas a significant amount of this data is made 
available by brokers seeking a profit, an equally substantial amount of information is being sold 
by government entities whose general obligation is to the people, not shareholders. This 
symbiotic relationship between the government and private data firms marginalizes the privacy 
of civilians who have no choice but to disclose their information if they want to be functional 
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members of our society. What is more, for the data brokers themselves, this merely represents 
the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the numerous, inconceivable ways in which they secretly 
collect information about you. 
A key factor to the growth of personal data as a precious commodity has been the rise of 
the internet. Nearly every single online action conducted by an individual is of worth to one 
company or another. In a sense, while the internet is a public domain many people believe to be 
free (although internet is not a basic utility), participating in the “free” services provided by the 
internet means an unwritten agreement that the actions and information divulged online is a 
commodity that one no longer owns. “Personal data is the new oil of the Internet and the new 
currency of the digital world” (Angwin 2014, 71).  The ways in which this personal data can be 
extrapolated from the digital world are both wide-ranging and highly complex, and data broker 
giants such as Acxiom have literally boiled this extrapolation down to a science—a science 
responsible for “the growth of a multibillion dollar industry that operates in the shadows with 
virtually no oversight” (Kroft 2014, 1).  
The titans of this industry are companies like Acxiom, Experian and Alliance Data 
Systems’ subsidiary, Epsilon. Despite having a combined market capitalization of nearly $30 
billion6, these same companies were once federally investigated and subsequently described by 
Jay Rockefeller, former chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, as “the dark underside of 
American life… in which people make a lot of money and cause people to suffer even more” 
(Bachman 2013, 1). Rockefeller’s criticism stemmed not only from the way in which these 
companies profit at the expense of the American people, but also from the secretive manner with 
                                                
6 According to Yahoo Finance as of 2017, Alliance Data Systems has a market cap of $12.2 billion, Acxiom has a 
market cap of $2.29 billion, and Experian has a market cap of $14.74 billion, all of which combines for a staggering 
$29.23 billion.  
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which they operate. According to Rockefeller during this 2013-2014 investigation, these 
companies were allegedly “stonewalling” him, refusing to cooperate and hand over data or 
relevant information about how their data-mining process works (Kroft 2014, 4). That being said, 
one of the big three, Acxiom, recently chose to make somewhat of a concession, offering the 
public a slight window into how this ‘dark underside of American life’ actually works—their 
intention was to gain positive PR, yet the result was not quite what they desired.  
While companies like Acxiom routinely collaborate with government entities to compile 
information about individuals, the greatest resource at their disposal is online tracking via HTTP 
cookies. Cookies came about with the rise of the internet, and while the true way in which they 
function is rather complicated, the service they provide enables every website a user visits to 
autonomously install small pieces data—or cookies—on the user’s browser. If you continue to 
use the same browser that the cookies were initially installed on, these cookies will then track 
your online activity long after you have left the site from which they came, and third parties with 
authorization from that site can observe you via these cookies. This innovation represented a 
revolutionary step for online advertisements in the early 2000s, and today cookies have become 
the essential lifeblood for this industry. When people first discovered what cookies were capable 
of in the late 1990s, as well as how they were being used by more and more advertisers, there 
was understandably a fair amount of outrage. Many people felt their rights had been violated, 
and by 2000 “a federal class action suit was brought against the online advertising company 
DoubleClick, alleging that its installation of cookies on the computers of website visitors was 
violating laws that limit wiretapping, hacking, and electronic surveillance” (Angwin 2014, 65). 
In what seems to be somewhat of a rare occurrence, judicial oversight stepped in and agreed with 
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the concerns of the people, ultimately deciding this was indeed a violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
Yet, after an appeal was filed, the typical perspective of the courts in regard to online 
surveillance seemed to return, and a judge from an appellate court in the Southern District of 
New York found that: 
[T]he DoubleClick-affiliated Websites are ‘parties to the communication[s]’ from 
plaintiffs and have given sufficient consent to DoubleClick to intercept them… Her 
ruling amounted to a free pass for corporate Internet surveillance: when a person visits a 
website, the website is free to invite others to secretly wiretap the visitor. (Angwin 2014, 
67) 
 Despite being relatively unknown, this court decision was one of the most critical rulings 
in recent history as it relates to the internet. It essentially laid the foundation for online 
advertising, an industry valued at $125.82 billion in 2014 with projections to be worth an 
estimated $220.38 billion by 2019.7 This profitable industry hinges upon cookie tracking, and it 
is companies like Acxiom that have mastered the science of mining them throughout the digital 
world. This enables Acxiom to compile massive aggregations of data that can then be deciphered 
through macro placement algorithms to reveal patterns such as purchasing trends, online betting 
habits, voter tendencies, etc. It is through this scientific process that data brokers have found 
great success. Marketing firms and businesses themselves purchase subsets of data from Acxiom 
at a great cost because the insight they gain can ultimately pay dividends in the long-term. What 
is more, social-networking corporations like Facebook and Twitter have paid Acxiom huge sums 
                                                
7 Statistics provided by marketsandmarkets.com’s report, “Online Advertising Market by Search Engine Marketing, 
Display Advertising, Classifieds, Mobile, Video, Lead Generation, Rich Media - Global Advancements, Forecasts & 
Analysis (2014 - 2019)” http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/online-advertising.asp 
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of money simply to learn the ways in which they can enhance and integrate their own HTTP 
cookie tracking systems (Angwin 2014, 70). Although this exchange required these social-
networking giants to pay millions of dollars, the millions of users that visit their websites every 
day made the purchase a simple decision from an economic perspective.   
Thus, these invasive tracking methods conceived by big data companies have now been 
put in the hands of some of the largest and most powerful tech corporations in the world, 
subsequently enabling the overall size of the data dragnet to expand at an exponential rate. The 
implications of this development are very significant for average citizens whose real lives are 
being surveilled through the digital footprints they unknowingly leave behind. Although some 
people choose to ignore the dangers brought about by this issue, the truth of the matter is that it 
places our general rights to privacy on a slippery slope—privacy both in the digital sense and the 
physical sense. Preventing this erosion of privacy will not be without struggle and effort from 
numerous parties, yet attempting to reclaim it after it has been lost will almost certainly be futile. 
In the end, one of the strongest lines of defense for American civil liberties is a coalescence of 
the people themselves, and unless enough of them can truly appreciate the risks to their privacy 
brought about by wide scale data mining, it is hard to imagine that these critical rights will not be 
further undermined. 
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Chapter Five: The Inherent Risks Created by an Industry That 
Treats the Individual as Both the Product and the Consumer 
 
 While the data collection industry is creating jobs and helping numerous businesses 
advance and develop, it also comes with a high level of risk that calls for increased oversight and 
accountability. With any business that deals with sensitive information about people’s lives, the 
risk of a security breach is immense. As one might expect, data collection companies have been 
hacked before and put people at risk who never even knew they were being watched. Building on 
this issue, it is critical to remember that data-collection firms do not simply collect swaths of 
internet activity, they “handle giant troves of sensitive personal information for many retailers, 
banks and other companies that deal directly with the public” (Sarno 2011). As these companies 
grow in number and size, they have increasingly become a popular target for hackers, a serious 
threat in today’s world.  
 Making matters worse, while one would expect this industry to be characterized by high 
levels of supervision and transparency, minimal amounts of regulation and oversight actually 
create the exact opposite environment. The internet is the “wild west” of the digital world—
lawless and nearly impossible to fully govern. While this enables vast amounts of crime in 
countless ways, we should not be so naïve as to think powerful corporations do not bend and 
often break the law as well in the quest for the almighty dollar. Yet, even when the improper 
collection of data by a corporation is discovered, the established punishments are so insignificant 
that corporate surveillance misconduct seems almost economically rational, albeit immoral. For 
example, three years ago Google “reached a $7 million settlement with thirty-seven states and 
the District of Columbia” because the company’s Street View vehicles were not just collecting 
panoramic photos, they were gathering massive quantities of private data, “including email and 
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text messages, passwords and web histories,” via unsecured Wi-Fi networks (Boghosian 2013, 
100). Google has a market capitalization of almost 600 billion dollars. A seven-million-dollar 
punishment is not even a slap on the wrist—constituting less than two thousandths of one percent 
of Google’s market cap—it is entirely irrelevant.  
Children’s Personal Data: Get Them While They’re Young (and Maybe You’ll Get Them 
for Life) 
 
Another example regarding corporate surveillance misconduct and the lack of 
repercussions is the various ways in which children’s information is collected. While specially 
catered advertisements are enticing generally, their effects are even more pervasive on the most 
impressionable members of society—children whose embrace for technology has increasingly 
begun at a younger age. Businesses like “McDonald’s, the Walt Disney Company, and a host of 
other corporations” are keenly aware of this truth, and thus they “try to access children as early 
as possible by routinely engaging in deceptive, inherently exploitative marketing practices” 
(Boghosian 2013, 108). As insidious as this may sound, it is nothing short of brilliant in the way 
in which it grooms children to be lifelong patrons of a given company. Children are literally built 
to absorb information at a young age from the moment their hippocampus develops and concrete 
memories are made possible. This cognitive adaptation is one of the most essential parts of 
human development. It can enable children to become bilingual, it can train them to become 
talented musicians, and it can also lead them to unwittingly develop strong bonds with certain 
brands and products. The key to all of this is essentially the idea that children are unaware it is 
even happening—it is subliminal. And with enough reinforcement, these subliminal messages 
can become embedded into a child’s thinking long after he or she has become an adult.  
 What is more, although children of today’s generation are more technologically savvy 
than ever before, this intelligence does not simultaneously create an enhanced ability to 
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distinguish general content from sponsored content8. Sponsored content has become so firmly 
entrenched in the various mediums of American entertainment that it is often difficult to notice 
for adults, let alone children. Building on this point, whereas adults are relatively aware of the 
risks and causes of identity theft, inherently naïve children are not equipped with this same 
caution and they routinely divulge precious information like their name, date of birth, address, 
etc. It may seem hard to believe how “aggressive, all-too-clever techniques enable corporations 
to capture personal information from millions of children,” but the real issue lies in the fact that 
“legal and regulatory protections have failed to keep pace with ever-changing technology and the 
methods used to target and expose children to corporate persuasion.” (Boghosian 2013, 180).   
The main safeguard for protecting the digital privacy rights of children is the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) which deals most specifically in protections for 
children under age 13 (Federal Trade Commission). While this act was specifically designed to 
keep pace with the dynamic nature of the internet and amend itself accordingly, it has proven 
time and time again to be ineffective in the sense that it intervenes long after the psychological 
damage has been done. COPPA has been at the heart of many successful lawsuits claiming 
illegal corporate persuasion, but the penalties levied against wealthy corporate defendants are 
negligible whereas the persuasive effects on the children are irreversible. One of the most 
noteworthy examples of this problem can be found in a marketing scheme created by the 
McDonald’s Corporation.  
McDonald’s tactics for successfully marketing to children have frankly been nothing 
short of pure genius in the past. They built playgrounds in their restaurants with the PlayPlace, 
                                                
8 Sponsored content is essentially “material in an online publication which resembles the publication's editorial 
content but is paid for by an advertiser and intended to promote the advertiser's product.” This form of advertising 
has increasingly appeared in all mediums of entertainment. 
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their mascot is a clown and they are technically the largest distributor of toys in the world, by far. 
These ideas have brought untold amounts of business to the fast-food chain, as well as massive 
increases in American childhood obesity. In any event, one of the corporation’s recent golden 
ideas to attract young consumers was through a game available on happymeal.com called 
‘McWorld’. The McDonald’s Corporation allocated a large sum of money to create sophisticated 
‘advergames’—essentially online video games that attract children in various ways and 
incorporate McDonald’s products throughout the game itself. The largest, most successful 
advergame was McWorld, McDonald’s own virtual world geared towards children where one 
collects codes from happy meal boxes that, per the website9, “unlock all kinds of cool stuff like 
exclusive accessories for your avatar or treehouse, interactive pets, or even events where your 
favorite movie, TV, or comic book characters may appear and play with you!” (Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) 2012, 3). McWorld’s success was largely due to the way in which it enabled 
children to create their own unique avatar which could play multiple games before the user had 
to enter personal information or purchase a Happy Meal. In this way, the addictive site hooked a 
large numbers of users before even gaining anything of real value to the corporation. Yet, soon 
after this stage of McWorld, the clever game reminds all non-members—kids that had created a 
free account that requires no input of personal information—that: 
 “‘[o]nly members can use Happy Meal codes to get special stuff!’ The website not only 
encourages children to spend time playing in the McDonald’s branded environment, but 
it also encourages them to purchase (or ask their parents to purchase) Happy Meals, 
create user accounts, and develop positive associations with Happy Meals. As McWorld 
loads on a child’s computer, a Happy Meal box appears with the caption “Happiness.” At 
                                                
9 The website and the game itself have since been taken down from the internet by McDonalds. However, the FTC 
report has a number of direct quotes from the former McWorld game, such as the one being referred to here. 
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least two games on the site—“Great Space Rescue” and “Suzi Van Zoom”—reward kids 
for collecting Happy Meals during gameplay.” (FTC 2012, 3). 
 While the entire concept of McWorld may seem silly, it is disturbingly clever at its core, 
and in the eyes of the FTC it undoubtedly constitutes unfair and deceptive marketing practices. 
Making matters worse, these duplicitous marketing techniques that preyed on young, healthy and 
impressionable children were not even the reason the FTC ultimately investigated McWorld and 
quickly decided it was in violation of COPPA. Rather, it was the games “refer-a-friend” feature 
that finally brought about its demise. The “refer-a-friend” function of the game is actually an 
extremely common function among all digital games and apps. It basically asks the user to input 
one or more of his or her friend’s email addresses or Facebook profiles in exchange for in-game 
rewards. The reward for the company that owns the game is far more valuable. It now has the 
ability to not only reach out to more prospective users, but to do so in a personalized way that 
makes it seem as if the offer is being conducted by the friend—this greatly increases the 
likelihood of the offer being accepted, and indeed they were. Thus, the number of children using 
the game proliferated to such a point that parents eventually took notice, nearly all of whom 
hated the idea of their children playing McDonald’s-sponsored videogames and never consented 
to having their children’s emails or social media profiles accessible by the McDonalds 
Corporation. From there, the FTC conducted a report deeming the entire McWorld site unlawful 
based most specifically on the lack of “verifiable parental consent for the collection, use or 
disclosure of personal information from children” (FTC 2012, 4). 
 The example provided by McWorld is a compelling one for several reasons, and it is 
important to mention that it is just one of many similarly deceptive corporate marketing schemes 
aimed at children. In fact, along with McDonald’s website geared towards children, four other 
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major corporations’ websites— “General Mills, Inc. and its TrixWorld.com and 
ReesesPuffs.com sites; Turner Broadcasting System’s CartoonNetwork.com; Viacom Inc.’s 
Nick.com site; and Doctor’s Associates Inc. and its SubwayKids.com site—were charged with 
circumventing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998” (Boghosian 2013, 184).  
Despite this charge by the FTC, these corporate giants suffered no real consequences beyond 
being forced to change their websites to legally align with COPPA or risk financial punishments. 
What is more, whereas most businesses stand to suffer greatly if they are forced to pay legal 
recompense, for corporations like McDonald’s, TBS (owned by Time Warner) and Viacom, such 
punishments are not even taken seriously. In fact, it is likely that the officials in charge of the 
FTC considered the immense costs they themselves would have been forced to spend if they 
attempted to take these corporations to court, all of whom have the most expensive legal teams 
money can buy on retainer year-round. In the end, these corporate giants who lie at the core of 
the American economy gained a major victory, especially when one considers the invaluable 
amount of influence they gained over young, future consumers before being ‘forced’ to change 
their ways. As a whole, the data collection and deceptive marketing exhibited by these 
corporations provides a strong example of the way in which digital privacy laws struggle to keep 
pace with technological advances, and how when this gap is created, it is greatly exploited for 
profit at the expense of consumers long before judicial oversight can investigate and ultimately 
put a stop to it. 
One can quite easily imagine the various ways in which internet advertisements influence 
children. However, bearing in mind kids’ preoccupation with smartphone and tablet games, 
many people, including parents, fail to realize that apps “are also insidious trackers able to 
pinpoint and store a child’s physical location, the telephone numbers of their friends, and more” 
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(Boghosian 2013, 192). Geo-location tracking is a surprisingly common feature for mobile Apps 
geared towards children, and these same children, as well as their parents, typically have no idea 
that they have enabled it when they choose to download and play the newest “free” game 
available in the App Store. This is not a minor occurrence; in fact, Angry Birds, an App that has 
been downloaded over 2 billion times, discretely mentions in its privacy policy that it has the 
right to not only track users’ location, but also store the aggregated data for independent use 
(Ball 2014, 1). Dragnets of personal data such as this are of great value to many businesses, and 
thus it is not surprising that only a minute fraction of popular children’s apps disclose their data 
collection polices at all.10 Unlike the corporate examples mentioned above, the tablet and mobile 
app “industry’s growth is fueled largely by small businesses, first-time developers, and even high 
school students without access to either legal counsel or privacy experts” (Boghosian 2013, 190-
1). Whereas large corporations bend digital privacy laws knowing they stand to gain more than 
they could ultimately lose, Silicon Valley tech startups often break these same rules without even 
knowing they exist.  
These small, poorly regulated companies routinely vend users’ personal data to “third 
parties, such as advertising networks or analytics companies,” and this is typically done simply 
to stay in business—despite the media attention and massive success some tech startups have 
had, some reports estimate upwards of 90% fail11 (Boghosian 2012, 191). With this in mind, it is 
not hard to believe how the people in charge of these small companies would act recklessly with 
                                                
10 According to a 2012 study of 400 popular children’s apps (200 Apple, 200 Android) conducted by the Federal 
Trade Commission: “the Apple app promotion pages…provided almost no information on individual developers’ 
data collection and sharing practices. Similarly, the Android app promotion pages that staff examined provided little 
information other than the mandatory “permissions.” Only three (1.5%) of the 200 Android apps even attempted to 
convey information about the purpose for the “permissions” (Federal Trade Commission 2012). 
11 According to the article “Silicon Valley's culture of failure … and 'the walking dead' it leaves behind” written by 
Rory Carroll of The Guardian, some statistically based estimates put the rate of startup failure as high as 90%. More 
conservative estimates report between 75-85% of all Silicon Valley startups fail, with the typical trend for 
companies being bankruptcy approximately 20 months after their last financing round. 
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users’ personal information in exchange for profit, especially if it extended the amount of time 
their business could survive or opened the door for new investments. What is more, this same 
carelessness reveals itself in these companies’ firewalls and basic security systems, or lack 
thereof. Large droves of users’ personal information represent a goldmine for professional 
hackers who can then sell this information on the black market. This is quickly becoming one of 
the leading causes of identity theft, and it happens to tech startups far more often than one might 
think. For example, one of the more well-known game designer companies, RockYou Inc., began 
enjoying considerable amounts of success after a handful of its apps gained immense popularity. 
However, this same company never decided to update its firewall, and eventually RockYou’s 
“inadequate security resulted in hackers gaining access to the personal data of 32 million users,” 
ultimately leading to an investigation by the FTC that subsequently revealed they were in 
violation of “COPPA by knowingly gathering the email addresses and passwords of 
approximately 179,000 children without first obtaining their parents’ consent.” (Boghosian 2012, 
292). This specific breach in privacy was severe, but similar examples happen all the time.  
All of these cases, both corporate and startup, suggest that there is a dire need to reform 
policies governing data collection and digital surveillance—especially as it relates to children—
yet efforts to do so by advocacy groups have proven to be ineffective. That is not to say that 
reforms have not been made to pieces of legislation such as COPPA. Rather, these reforms are 
often minor and they take far too much time to be established. Corporations, on the other hand, 
are constantly on the forefront of using new technologies to continue collecting personal data in 
increasingly effective ways. By the time these tactics are identified and possibly deemed illegal, 
these same companies will be ten steps ahead, already looking forward to even more advanced 
ways to achieve their goal. Until this is fully understood and radical changes are brought about, 
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preventing these continued breaches in privacy that put both adult and children at risk will 
inevitably continue to occur. This truth lies not in some nefarious corporate plot, but rather in the 
basic principles of Moore’s Law. The exponential advancement of technology is an unstoppable 
force. Pieces of legislation similar to COPPA need to stop trying to work in opposition to this 
fact and instead be theorized with its principles shaping every aspect. Despite all the evidence 
suggesting how imperative these changes are becoming, attempts for reform have been thwarted 
by a suppressive political environment bolstered by the power of corporate-government 
collaboration. 
However, while there are undoubtedly points to be made about the way in which 
corporate-government collaboration stymies vital reforms, is there not anything that can be done 
by the citizens themselves to prevent the pervasive surveillance, collection and vending of their 
own personal data? The American people elect their representatives with the hope that these 
officials will then carry out the collective will of their respective constituencies, yet does this 
subsequently mean that the will of the actual constituent no longer matters? In other words, are 
we as American citizens helpless in the protection of our own personal data—is there nothing 
that we can do, as individuals, to defend ourselves? 
Opting Out: The Futility of Trying to Protect Your Personal Data Without Immense 
Sacrifice 
 
One of the greatest obstacles average citizens face in in trying to prevent the collection of 
their personal data is the fact that so many of the government agencies and corporations that 
collect this data also provide vital services that nearly every American has used at one point in 
his or her life. This basic insight ties into one of the larger observations of this entire thesis, 
essentially the idea that the enticing technological advances created by government-corporate 
collaboration make our lives far easier and more manageable, yet simultaneously force us to 
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develop immense dependence on these same technologies. This dependence is unquestionably 
irreversible, and thus the valuable information we routinely disclose to use these ‘free’ services 
is the price we pay—but does it have to be this way? Is there no way to enjoy the comforts 
brought about by technology without subsequently eroding our privacy and basic freedoms? 
Unfortunately, while there are people and companies in the United States attempting to offer this 
service, the reality of the situation is that our dependence on corporate-government technological 
services has become so great that opting out of this relationship is inconvenient and troublesome 
to a point that largely renders the option unrealistic.  
 While there are thousands of companies and government agencies that have profited from 
civilians’ overwhelming reliance on their services, the best examples to be analyzed can be 
found in the handful of corporate giants who essentially laid the framework for this entire 
relationship—corporations that, if they were to hypothetically disappear tomorrow, would throw 
the entire American economy into utter disarray. Of all the examples of major companies that 
play a role in data collection and vending, there is perhaps none greater than Google—a 
company with a market cap hovering just below $600 billion whose name has essentially been 
converted into a verb known the world over. The advertising services offered by Google account 
for the vast majority of its income, and all of these advertisements are specifically catered to 
individual web users based on their compiled search queries and web history. The specific way 
in which this process works is highly elaborate, essentially using peoples’ IP addresses as a 
tracking module that links them to every search query and actual webpage they visit via 
google.com. For the sake of remaining clear and to the point, an actual explanation of the science 
behind Google’s tracking-advertisement technology is unnecessary. That being said, it is highly 
likely you have noticed the peculiar way in which advertisements on non-Google websites 
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sometimes appear to be offering products that you recently investigated while using Google. To 
make this more clear, I will offer a brief personal example that actually relates to my 
construction of this thesis.  
After doing a considerable amount of research on Maptitude via Google searches to 
bolster my chapter on political data mining, I noticed just one day later that a European sports 
website I routinely visit—http://www.fullmatchesandshows.com—now appeared to be 
advertising Caliper Corporation’s Maptitude services on the front page. Based solely on two days 
of considerable research I conducted regarding Maptitude, Google’s algorithms predicted I 
would be a likely candidate to purchase Maptitude’s services, and thus one of my most 
frequented websites that happens to be contracted by Google’s advertising services is now 
providing me with a poignant example of how my web searches shape the products being 
advertised to me online.  An even more peculiar example can be identified through the fact that I 
passionately watch European soccer year-round, a sport that is watched online in this country 
primarily by Spanish-speaking people. Thanks to Google’s ad-tracking services, I now routinely 
find myself watching video advertisements completely in Spanish before any video I watch on 
YouTube, ESPN, Facebook, etc. Google tracks countless terabytes of data every day to 
algorithmically identify trends that can help companies advertise their products more effectively 
online. Yet, according to Google’s data, the large majority of people who love to watch soccer in 
this country speak Spanish—despite the fact that I do not speak Spanish, my digital footprint 
tells a different story, and thus I have no choice but to either stop using Google, or simply get 
used to advertisements in Spanish. This illustrates one of the largest faults of the data collection 
industry—essentially the idea that much of the data collected from people is routinely 
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misinterpreted, and even when these false assumptions are identified by the user, the same user 
has no ability to correct these errors. 
As stated before, the only other legitimate option a user has in this situation is to refrain 
from using Google’s highly convenient web services—the same goes for the services offered by 
Bing, Yahoo, Ask, etc.—and instead try and use a search engine that does not collect the data of 
everyone who uses it. For those few people who are genuinely trying to break their dependence 
on Google because of issues with data collection, the best search engine that can still satisfy their 
search needs is a small search engine called DuckDuckGo. DuckDuckGo has an extensive policy 
regarding data collection on the privacy section of their website, but their homepage accurately 
sums it up with three basic statements: “1) We don’t store your personal information. 2) We 
don’t follow you around with ads. 3) We don’t track you, including private browsing mode12” 
(DuckDuckGo.com). Having established the basic way in which DuckDuckGo protects user 
privacy, one will now see all the subtle sacrifices that come with this decision, essentially the 
multitude of convenient services provided by Google that often are not even recognized by users 
until they are no longer functioning.  
Of all the sacrifices that come with a departure from Google, the largest and most readily 
apparent is the loss of Google’s flawless memory and search suggestions, all of which are based 
on the stored information from every previous search a user has made. In other words, when you 
Google something basic, such as ‘good food near me,’ Google will provide you with a complex 
list of quality restaurants based on all available online reviews, simultaneously listing the 
                                                
12 Many people have an incorrect understanding about how common web browsers’ private browsing or incognito 
mode works. They believe that once the function is turned on, their data is no longer tracked or collected. Julia 
Angwin does well in summing up the reality of these privacy modes, stating: “Not to put too fine a point on it, but 
Incognito mode [or Private Browsing mode] is built for one thing: browsing porn. It removes the cookies with porn 
names from your computer so your spouse won’t see. The website and its advertisers on those sites still know you 
were there” (Angwin 2014, 254). 
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specific distance each restaurant is relative to you down to a tenth of a mile. If you put this same 
search into DuckDuckGo—assuming you have not allowed DuckDuckGo to track your location, 
one of the most invasive functions people concerned about data collection take issue with—then 
the search engine will simply give you a list of websites specifically designed to find good 
restaurants near your location, all of which collect and store your data, thereby defeating the 
purpose of using DuckDuckGo in the first place.  
What is more, people often fail to realize just how helpful Google’s stored memory is in 
terms of eliminating the need for the user to remember or bookmark websites that they 
frequently visit. Once a user makes the transition to DuckDuckGo, he or she must consider the 
fact that their stored web memory and basic web history no longer exist. Once again relating the 
argument to my personal experiences creating this thesis, if I was not able to check my web 
history and easily revisit sites I previously used to learn about a given topic, I would have 
literally been forced to bookmark hundreds of websites, coordinating all of them with precise 
tags that would enable me to remember what specific information I gleaned from them. This 
would be tedious to say the least, causing me more than enough of an inconvenience to 
ultimately abandon any valiant effort to stand up to data collection at the individual level. 
Building on this point of basic convenience, identical searches are far more helpful and thorough 
when done through Google rather than DuckDuckGo. While this is a relatively obvious 
statement considering Google is the largest search engine in the world, it is important to mention 
that the comparative difference in search results is massive. For example, a basic search of 
‘Union College’ yielded just over 100 results in DuckDuckGo, the same search yields 
approximately 22,300,000 when done through Google. Clearly this does not mean a user cannot 
find what he or she is looking for when using DuckDuckGo, but it does reveal the profound 
  46 
difference in scope between search engines that store user data, and search engines that do not. In 
the end, DuckDuckGo is a legitimate alternative to search engines like Google that store your 
personal data, but it is far less easy to use, and it still represents just one piece of the puzzle. To 
genuinely achieve freedom from Google data collection, one must delete his or her Gmail—
something not even feasible for college students and employees13—one must no longer use 
Google Maps, or Google Docs, or Google Drive, etc. Remember, despite Google being the 
biggest company routinely profiting from the collection of personal data, they are still just one of 
the thousands of businesses that perpetuate this issue, ultimately making the idea of individually 
opting out less and less feasible. 
Another corporate giant that vends user data in countless ways often unbeknownst to the 
user is Facebook, the most popular social media website that boasts over 1.23 billion active users 
to date. Facebook is an intriguing example because its services are completely free, yet it still 
tries to convey to users the idea that they have complete control over their information, 
especially when it comes to who can and cannot see this information. Just to be clear from the 
outset, this is simply not true anymore. While this may have been the case way back when the 
company first began—these were the days when having a Facebook meant the user was 
associated with an elite university via his or her .edu email—Facebook itself has greatly evolved 
since it was founded in 2004, and in many ways it is an entirely new entity when compared to its 
original format. Since the time in which the company began pushing the former social media 
giant, MySpace, into relative obscurity, “Facebook has… repeatedly abused users’ trust,” 
changing its privacy policies hundreds of times each year to a point in which users had “to dig 
                                                
13 According to Time Inc.’s article, “Google and Microsoft: The Battle Over College E-Mail,” nearly every single 
college and university not just in the United States, but the entire world, uses the email services of either Google or 
Microsoft Outlook, both of which legally collect all emails for independent use, i.e. data mining.  
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deep in its menus to reclaim control of [their] data” (Angwin 2014, 328). What is more, there 
have been actual lawsuits brought against Facebook when their abuse of user data led to serious 
issues such as when they created a program called Beacon in 2007 that shared people’s online 
purchases with everyone they were connected to despite not actually informing the purchaser. 
This led to countless incidents, such as when a man bought a diamond ring for his wife on 
overstock.com without being notified “that his purchase was automatically posted to all 720 of 
his friends, including his wife. In 2009, Facebook agreed to pay $9.5 million to settle a class 
action lawsuit over Beacon and to shut down the service” (Angwin 2014, 328). One would have 
hoped this would be the end of the corporation’s efforts to convert its users into literal 
advertisements, yet all it really did was send the people in charge of concept back to the drawing 
board. Lo and behold: 
Instead of dropping the idea of turning its users into free product advertisements… 
Facebook revived it in 2011 with a product called Sponsored Stories that allowed 
advertisers to buy the rights to republish a user’s post and display it to that user’s friends 
as an advertisement. In 2013, Facebook agreed to pay $20 million to settle a class action 
lawsuit over Sponsored Stories. But rather than do away with the product, Facebook 
simply added new language to its privacy policy to make it clear to users that Facebook 
has the right to use its customers’ images and posts in advertisements. In other words, 
Facebook has been waging a six-year war to be able to turn its users’ conversations into 
ads that it can sell. (Google has since joined the fray, launching a similar program called 
“shared endorsements” that will turn users’ reviews, ratings, and comments into 
advertisements.) (Angwin 2014, 327-329) 
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 Corporations like Facebook and Google offer some of the most widely used web services 
in the world, and as this information shows, despite their attempts to lead users into believing 
their data is not routinely sold at a profit, these statements cannot be further from the truth. Yet, 
in the end, while it is highly inconvenient to abstain from using the services provided by these 
companies, that does not mean it is impossible. But what options do individuals have if they 
want to opt out of having their information collected by data brokers? This is arguably an even 
more insidious way by which user data is collected, stored, sold, and often misinterpreted. While 
there are several ways in which an individual can safeguard his or her online data, the most 
effective strategy is through purchasing and installing comprehensive software that blocks the 
equally comprehensive software used by companies to track one’s digital footprint. Of all the 
different types of software available today, the two most effective examples are Adblock Plus 
and NoScript. Adblock Plus is most commonly—though not exclusively—used with the web 
browser, FireFox, and it essentially does exactly what it sounds like it would, block 
advertisements from appearing. However, its true brilliance lies in the fact that, unlike other ad 
blockers that merely put the advertisement out of sight, Adblock Plus disallows advertisers from 
dropping any HTTP tracking cookies on a user’s computer, essentially rendering all online 
advertisements useless while also preventing data brokers from spying on a user’s future web 
activity. Adblock Plus is actually an excellent tool for people interested in heightening the 
security of their personal information on the internet. That being said, it essentially equates to a 
nuclear option in that it opts out of online advertisement data collection by completely opting out 
of online advertising itself, something that plenty of people consider a very helpful, convenient 
resource that they would not want to give up for just a minor victory in the overall war against 
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data mining. NoScript, on the other hand, represents a more interesting example in that it 
fundamentally transforms the way in which one uses the internet after being installed.  
 NoScript is an even more comprehensive piece of software than Adblock Plus, and thus 
its effects on a user’s web experience are far more profound. After installation, NoScript 
essentially disallows executable web content from sources like JavaScript, Java, Silverlight, 
Flash and many other application frameworks that essentially function as the fuel with which any 
given website can run. The issue with NoScript is similar to the issue with Adblock Plus in that 
its effectiveness lies in its almost nuclear approach to preventing data collection. For example, 
this software prevents the functioning of JavaScript, a technology at the very foundation of the 
World Wide Web that “can be used to load all sorts of tracking technology, including cookies, 
and can even be used to monitor how you move your mouse on the page. But it also has a lot of 
legitimate uses” (Angwin 2014, 355).  
In truth, saying that JavaScript ‘also has a lot of legitimate uses’ is quite an 
understatement for people who have no prior familiarity with this technology—JavaScript 
having legitimate uses in relation to the internet is the equivalent of saying gasoline has 
legitimate uses in relation to automobiles—the latter relies on the former to function. JavaScript 
has been a fundamental building block of websites since the nascent stages of the internet, and 
today internet statistics report that 94.4% of all websites use JavaScript.14 Not surprisingly, 
within this 94.4% is essentially every website you have ever visited—the most popular include 
sites like Google.com, Youtube.com, Twitter.com, Facebook.com, Linkedin.com, Yahoo.com, 
Wikipedia.com, Amazon.com, Baidu.com, etc. To make matters simpler, one would have a 
substantially harder time finding a website that does not use JavaScript as compared to finding 
                                                
14 According to W3Techs.com reliable internet usage statistics on Client-side Languages, Usage of JavaScript for 
websites is approximately 94.4%. https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/cp-javascript/all/all 
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one that does. With this point established, one can more fully appreciate the nuclear aspect of 
what implementing NoScript entails—in a sense, it is protecting a user’s personal data by closing 
him or her off from 94.4% of the entire internet. It would be misleading not to mention that 
NoScript enables users to allow the functioning of JavaScript and other codes on a website to 
website basis, but the entire point of preventing data vending from third-parties is subsequently 
defeated in that nearly every single website in existence today cannot function without these 
scripts. Thus, to truly opt out from the pervasive online collection and vending of personal data is 
virtually impossible unless one chooses to opt out from the internet entirely, something most 
people in the United States cannot even seriously consider.  
While it may seem unfair to claim abstention from the internet is unrealistic in American 
society, especially if you pose this question to senior citizens, for people of my generation the 
internet has undoubtedly become a societal imperative growing in importance every year. Clay 
Shirkey, a philosopher whose recent works analyze the effects of the internet on Western 
Civilization, summed it up best when he wrote: 
The Internet has so permeated our lives that its influence is becoming impossible to see. 
Imagining today minus the Net is as content-free an exercise as imagining London in the 
1840s with no steam power, New York in the 1930s with no elevators, or L.A. in the 
1970s with no cars. After a while, the trellis so shapes the vine that you can’t separate the 
two. (Snow 2016, 3) 
This insightful point ties well into the basic argument made above regarding just how 
problematic it has become for someone to protect his or her personal data at an individual level. 
To successfully do so would ultimately eliminate the practicality of using the internet in the first 
place, and as Shirkey suggests, in this day and age, completely opting out of the internet is the 
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equivalent of marginalizing oneself to the periphery of American society. The way in which 
corporate America profits through treating civilians as both the product and the consumer simply 
cannot be stopped by the civilians themselves. One of the greatest concerns surrounding this 
issue is the fact that millions of Americans are still unaware any of this is even taking place. 
These people stand to suffer the most in that they are unwittingly perpetuating the problem 
because nobody has ever explained to them the countless ways in which corporate-government 
collaboration exploits their personal information. This is not to place blame on uninformed 
citizens or claim widespread negligence; after all, the only real way in which data collection is 
required to be disclosed to its subjects is via privacy policies and ‘Do you Accept’ updates. We 
have all encountered these absurdly long disclaimers carefully crafted by lawyers to include 
subtle clauses with immense implications amid countless pages of drawn out legal jargon—all of 
which is generally there to give readers a headache, thereby leading them to click agree so they 
can get on with their lives. In the end, we as individuals are simply not equipped with enough 
resources to protect ourselves from corporate-government surveillance, and just as we rely on 
government for protection in other aspects of society, we may need to rely on it now more than 
ever when it comes to maintaining our right to privacy in an increasingly digital world.   
Yet, as has been shown through countless examples of corporate success, digital privacy 
laws as they currently stand are more or less an anachronism when one truly considers the rate at 
which technology is advancing. Legitimate resolutions to this problem need to come through 
legislation, and this legislation needs to be shaped with an acceptance that the rate of 
technological advancement is unpredictable and in need of regular examination in relation to the 
way in which it can be unleashed at the expense of American citizens. However, while these 
theories are viable options to resolve this growing dilemma, they are rarely mentioned by U. S. 
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elected officials save for a select few who do not care if they are in the unpopular minority. At 
first blush, it may seem odd that more men and women in Congress are not advocating for 
increased digital privacy laws to protect American citizens. However, when faced with the risk 
of being labeled “unpatriotic” for damaging our efforts in the war against terror, and perhaps 
more importantly at risk of biting the corporate hand that feeds significant election campaign and 
lobbying dollars into the coffers of these same officials, the reticence to tackle this issue on 
behalf of a constituent population that is largely unaware of the threat to its privacy rights may 
not seem so odd after all.  One suspects that it may take a large-scale catastrophic event affecting 
a significant percent of the electorate to spur meaningful action in this area. Perhaps the spying 
files of the Central Intelligence Agency recently disclosed by WikiLeaks will be the catalyst; 
however, given the entrenched nature of the symbiotic relationship between the government and 
corporate America in this regard, one should not be too optimistic. 
The Unchecked Power of Corporate-Government Collaboration: How the Enhanced 
Surveillance State Perpetuates Itself 
 
 The deep-rooted, mutually beneficial relationship between corporations and government 
not only functions to advance the interests of both groups, it creates a political landscape where 
political reform is discouraged and repressed in numerous aspects of American society. While 
appearing conspiratorial and collusive on the surface, the actual logic behind this arrangement is 
rather simple. With the growth in corporate power over the past few decades, it would be rational 
to believe that the federal government should curb the amount of civilian data being collected by 
these entities. Yet, when this same data is of vital importance to the government as well, and 
corporations have better technology and access to the data, the original logic becomes flawed—
why would the government push for policies that limit its ability to pursue its anti-terrorism 
agenda, which it believes is of vital importance? Conversely, with a shared interest in an 
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intangible commodity for different reasons, it is only practical that the two entities have used 
each other to advance their respective personal agendas.  What is more, those in elected positions 
to defend civil liberties within the government are often bolstered by corporate lobbying in their 
path towards winning the position in the first place (Schneier 2013). A primary concern of 
people in office is gaining reelection—thus, to push for reform on the issue of data collection 
would almost certainly weaken one’s chances for reelection, thereby representing an illogical 
political decision.  
 The combination of all these factors creates an environment in which powerful, well-
funded lobbyists disseminate misleading and inaccurate ideas to weaken reform movements. Of 
all the flawed ideas repeatedly forced upon American society by the heads of business and 
government, one of the most damaging of all has been the basic principle that surveillance makes 
us safer. In fact, the inundation of advanced surveillance technology has actually endangered the 
populace in a number of ways. First and foremost, the prevailing assumption that more cameras 
correlates to less crime is statistically incorrect. In fact, while “cities invest hundreds of millions 
of dollars in surveillance cameras” without “evidence…that they deter crime,” the subsequent 
waste of resources actually opens the door for even more detrimental crime (Boghosian 2013, 
403). This underlies the inherently flawed logic behind our nation’s prioritization of crime. 
While millions of Americans detest those involved in urban violence fueled by years of racial 
tension and institutional impoverishment, people have already seemed to stop caring that not one 
single banker was arrested for defrauding millions of investors, and repossessing the homes of 
millions of American families in a financial crisis that cost the U.S. over 10 trillion dollars (The 
Cost of the Crisis 2012).  As “the war on terror” sank enormous capital into ineffective domestic 
surveillance, “[t]he investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime plummeted, a boon to the 
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Wall Street plunderings [sic] that helped create the greatest economic crisis in America since the 
1930s” (Boghosian 2013, 402). Thus, while most people seem to ignore this fact, the political 
environment created by corporate and political elites has conversely functioned to silence anyone 
critical of the “war on terror” and its damaging, long-term implications. Despite all the evidence 
suggesting increased investment in surveillance technology fails to demonstrably increase 
national security while benefiting the wealthy and powerful, the corporate controlled media 
created “the linkage of national identity to national security… to create a climate in which 
dissent and opposition became equated with anti-Americanism” (Hutcheson 2004, 47). In the 
end, corporate and government interests in data collection are not the sole causes for the 
enhanced American surveillance state—we as a population must also bear some measure of 
responsibility for failing to protect against policies and activities which threatened our 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
European Data Protection: A World of Difference 
 
 Whereas the American surveillance state’s growth has been enabled through a 
legislative disregard for digital privacy, the European model offers an intriguing counterexample 
in that both the views of the people and the role of the state are fundamentally different than our 
own. Although American legislation has been put in place to protect digital privacy, its 
enforcement lacks coordination and its overall scope does not share the European view that 
citizens deserve total control over their personal data at an individual level, regardless of the 
implications. American privacy laws have historically been strong and similar to those of the 
European Union in that all citizens have an implicit right to privacy. However, unlike the 
European Council, the American government has not effectively extended these protections of 
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individual privacy into the rapidly expanding digital world, nor has it seemingly taken the 
position that such protections are even warranted.  
Despite the fact that we all now live in this digital world to varying degrees, it is the 
apparent belief of the federal government that this digital world is not explicitly within its 
jurisdiction, and thus undeserving of the same regulation. This same logic applies itself 
conversely to what federal agencies like the NSA and the CIA feel they are permitted to do 
through this unregulated medium. In other words, the federal government routinely uses this 
digital realm to achieve certain goals that would otherwise be illegal, or impossible, if carried out 
by conventional means. As the research shows, this general perspective has been embraced and 
capitalized upon by countless players in corporate America as well, subsequently expanding the 
scope of the internet along with our global dependence on it. This has led to countless breaches 
of innocent people’s privacy, and it seems that only when these breaches involve very public 
matters or significant criminal acts that the government sees no choice but to intervene. This is 
the fatal flaw in the American model—legislative efforts…[are] mounted in response to specific 
and egregious harms,” yet [a]dvancing privacy as a matter of individual rights across the 
corporate sector generally has little legislative or regulatory traction” (Bamberger & Mulligan 
2015, 444). Whereas the American model takes a shortsighted, reactionary approach to digital 
privacy, the European model takes a completely different approach, instead opting to be the 
primary guardian for digital privacy rights, most specifically at the individual level. Unlike its 
American counterpart, the European Union’s basic model seems to embrace the notion that 
effective legislation cannot keep pace with the dynamic expansion of technology unless the two 
are inextricably linked.  
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This European approach to the protection of digital privacy and surveillance has been 
exhibited since the dragnet collection of online data began to take shape, most notably through 
the EU’s approval of the Data Protection Directive in 1995. This comprehensive piece of 
legislation displayed a wholehearted embrace of the rights of individuals, essentially granting 
European citizens the right to correct or simply delete any personal information they find online, 
as well as block companies from transferring their data to a third-party, even if this entity is 
outside their borders. This ambitious bill crafted over twenty years ago says a lot about the 
profound way in which the European approach to privacy differs from that of America. Whereas 
the U.S. government has run into trouble by enabling unregulated corporate interests to encroach 
upon civil liberties, the European approach was so preemptive and thorough that it ran into 
similar difficulties enforcing these laws as transnationals—primarily based in the United 
States—began dominating the digital landscape (Bamberger & Mulligan 2015, 141). Large 
aggregates of personal data collected from people living in the European Union were arguably of 
even greater value to these companies because they opened the door for untapped markets. Thus, 
data brokers and large internet based corporations began utilizing the full extent of their 
technology and influence to circumvent European data protections just as they have in the United 
States.  
However, demonstrating its dedication to the continued protection of European 
individuals’ privacy, the EU passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in April of 
2016, the single most comprehensive initiative to combat unwarranted surveillance and data 
mining to date. While technically an update to the 1995 Data Protection Directive, the GDPR can 
more accurately be described as a complete overhaul, tightly binding data protection policy and 
enforcement between all member states and eliminating any room for substantive national 
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deviations (Bamberger & Mulligan 2015, 31). The GDPR was first proposed before the 
European Parliament back in late 2011, and after lengthy deliberations among representatives 
from all 28 member states, it has officially been approved with plans to take effect on May 25, 
2018 following a two-year transition period. The GDPR is a comprehensive piece of legislation 
that uses all available resources at the disposal of the EU to protect citizens’ personal data, 
specifically facilitating free circulation of data within the union while barring external collection 
and exploitation abroad. Unlike the United States government, the EU has been clear and 
expansive in regard to what it considers personal data protected by the state—Viviane Reding, 
European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, explains:  
Personal data is any information relating to an individual, whether it relates to his or her 
private, professional or public life. It can be anything from a name, a photo, an email 
address, bank details, your posts on social networking websites, your medical 
information, or your computer's IP address… everyone has the right to personal data 
protection in all aspects of life: at home, at work, whilst shopping, when receiving 
medical treatment, at a police station or on the Internet… In a globalized[sic] world, the 
transfer of data to third countries has become an important factor in daily life… and there 
are no borders online… (Reding 2012, 2) 
 This comprehensive perspective held by the EU regarding digital privacy laws and 
enforcement differs meaningfully from that of the United States, and as of May 25, 2018, 
American corporations stand to suffer significantly. These American transnationals have 
historically been in control of the digital world, and much of their success has come as a direct 
result. If these same corporations refuse to accept the vast transformations the European digital 
landscape is primed to undergo, serious conflicts may arise that set the two entities against each 
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other. Yet, unlike the United States, the European Union has no allegiance or critical dependence 
on these same corporations, and it has chosen to place the rights of its citizens above their 
interests. This is where the final divergence between the American model and the European 
model can be identified—the rights afforded to corporations are fundamentally different.  
The United States has a much more lenient view on corporations in general, essentially 
viewing them as a number of persons united in one body for one purpose, thereby deserving of 
the same rights and protections as the people themselves. This generalized definition has evolved 
over the course of American history, and the process of its evolution has been significantly 
influenced through various decisions made by the Supreme Court. The most recent ruling of this 
sort was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, and in it the Supreme Court voted 5-4 
in favor of corporations’ right to make unrestricted political expenditures. This ruling has 
significantly altered the political landscape and corporate influence therein, and the perpetuation 
of digital surveillance and data collection has come as a direct result. Citizens United has 
allowed immeasurable sums of corporate dark money to flood the political world, essentially 
making one’s chances of winning a seat in Congress nearly impossible without it in some form.  
As a result, the true allegiance of our elected officials has been thrown into question—why vie 
for comprehensive digital privacy legislation on behalf of the people if it will threaten your 
relationship with corporate backers? While American corporations are afforded rights similar to 
the American people, the two groups are widely dissimilar. Corporate interests belonging to a 
wealthy, powerful few are being placed above the rights of millions of Americans lacking these 
same resources. Unlike representatives in Europe who have committed to individual privacy 
rights through the implementation of the GDPR, the majority of Americans in Congress have 
shown they lack the courage to defy corporate America and stand up for the individual citizens. 
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Unfortunately, until rulings such as Citizens United are repealed, this transformation is unlikely 
to occur, thereby making the opportunity for comprehensive surveillance and data protection 
unrealistic. History has shown that substantial legislation in favor of disenfranchised people is 
often opposed until sudden, catastrophic events catalyze intervention—abolition required the 
Civil War, the Great Depression led to the New Deal, and September 11, 2001 triggered two 
wars costing over $2 trillion. While these examples are extreme, the basic principle remains the 
same—monumental changes to American society are often brought about by catastrophic 
circumstances. As the cycle of mass surveillance and dragnet data collection continue to spiral 
out of control, one can only speculate as to the inconceivable disasters that may finally force 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
All political thinking for years past has been vitiated in the same way. People can foresee the 
future only when it coincides with their own wishes, and the most grossly obvious facts can 
be ignored when they are unwelcome. (George Orwell) 
  
The evolution of American surveillance and data collection was not an undetectable 
development. Rather, we allowed ourselves to remain ignorant, placing too much faith in 
institutions as to which we would be wise to always maintain a healthy skepticism. As mentioned 
above, the development and abuses in data collection between corporate-government 
collaboration were not unforeseeable, but in fact a result of logical processes. The “war on 
terror” gave the government the opportunity to expand its surveillance activities, and as it had in 
the 1970s, the government seized this opportunity.  As these activities expanded and data 
collection became a growing and profitable industry, it was to be expected that corporations 
would similarly seize the opportunity to exploit the government’s willingness to spend 
significant sums of money in these endeavors.  It was in many ways almost inevitable that the 
two groups would be true to their natures—while perhaps “strange bedfellows,” the arrangement 
was mutually beneficial and thus its development and growth are not surprising.   
Our fault lies in the fact that we failed to heed the warnings of people such as Edward 
Snowden, those brave enough to stand up as the unpopular minority in an attempt to defend the 
rights afforded to us by the Constitution. Many citizens chose to ignore what they simply did not 
want to believe. Yet, history has shown that this is one of the worst things we as citizens can do. 
As Americans, we are not merely given the right to come together and create political change, 
we are tasked with a responsibility to participate politically in defense of civil liberties people 
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before us fought to guarantee. One of these most basic liberties is privacy and it has arguably 
never faced a greater challenge in American society than that posed by mass digitalization.  The 
final chapters of the story of domestic surveillance and mass data collection have not yet been 
written.  It would be naïve to suggest that all surveillance and data collection activities are 
detrimental to society, and even more naïve to expect that they will cease, especially as 
technological advances further enable their expansion.  However, we cannot allow the positive 
elements of these activities, as well as our seemingly insatiable appetite for and dependency on 
technology, to weaken our commitment to the protection of our fundamental rights.  These rights 
were established as a means to create limits on the power of the government.  As data 
increasingly becomes a commodity, we must remember that it is our commodity, and it is 
indelibly linked to our privacy. We must be vigilant in ensuring that it is used in a responsible, 
ethical and legal manner. 
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